I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies, in Stockholm. I am a part of the Climate Ethics project. 

I am completing my PhD in philosophy at the London School of Economics, working with Roman Frigg and Richard Bradley. I hope to have my viva in May/June 2020.

I work on two related fields: (1) decision-making under conditions of severe uncertainty, and (2) scientific modelling, especially as a source of evidence for decisions. My recent work has focused on climate science, and in particular on the prediction of hurricanes striking North America.

More broadly, I am interested in the social epistemology of science: how it should be organised, and how it should interact with the rest of society. Much of my work can be characterised as formal epistemology (i.e., I use mathematical tools), though much of my interest is in non-ideal, messy situations in which our favoured formal tools fare poorly. 

A copy of my CV is available here.

I help organise the LSE’s Conjectures and Refutations seminar series.

Before beginning my PhD I worked as a management consultant for Bain & Co., and then in the strategy team for London-based property developers Lodha UK. I have a Master’s in theoretical physics from the University of Cambridge, and my undergraduate degree was in Physics and Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand.

I have also worked as a freelance consultant, on strategy, management and decision-making.

Highlights

Recent papers

Making confident decisions with model ensembles [preprint, forthcoming in Philosophy of Science]

Recent talks

• “Making confident decisions with ensembles” – EPSA 2019 Geneva 
• “Formal epistemology as modelling” – PROGIC 2019 Frankfurt 
• “Formal Epistemology as modelling” – FEW 2019 Turin [poster]

Blog

• Management consulting as morally risky work
• Weathering catastrophic storms (LSE Philosophy Blog)

Work in progress papers

(Email me for drafts)

•  Making confident decisions with model ensembles (R&R)
• Formal epistemology as normative modelling
• Expert deference as a belief revision schema